Monday, 2 March 2020

Rhetorics of the Culture Wars: Is Biological Sex a Spectrum?


There's a moment during V for Vendetta when the voiceover tells us ominously that at a certain point in the recent history of the authoritarian dystopia which the film depicts, "America's War" reached England. The film was released during the days of the War of Terror and is saturated with the rhetoric and imagery of that era. Fifteen years on and it is the American Culture Wars that are threatening to make a wholesale jump over the Atlantic, and nowhere is this felt more strongly than in the politics of sex and gender. 

One skirmish linked tangentially but significantly to current struggles over transgender-rights is whether biological sex is binary or exists as a "spectrum". A relatively recent article in Scientific American by their associate graphics editor Amanda Montañez, has even gone so far as to create a visualisation purporting to show the spectrum of biological sex and how each position within the spectrum relate to each other during development from birth, through puberty to adulthood.

The Anglophone world has seen huge changes over the past half century in the way in which sexuality and gender are conceived. We're by now familiar with thinking of both in a variety of different ways, and thankfully long gone are the days when homosexuals like Alan Turing would be prosecuted and subjected to electric shock treatment. More recently has been a rise in the prominence of trans-politics and rights claims being made in order to depathologize and demedicalize the status of transgendered people and the process of changing a person's legal gender. In the UK this has risen to public consciousness owing to proposed changes to the Gender Recognition Act (2004) that would allow a person to change their legal gender without the need for approval by doctors or psychiatrists. 

The proposals and subsequent public consultation have elicited a backlash from some women's groups; one of their claims being that so called "self-ID" would undermine women's spaces by making it too easy for biological men to change their gender and access them. There are also questions about the impact of potentially removing the sex based exemptions from the UK Equality Act which has allowed spaces like women's refuges to deny access to trans-women and to exclude them from women's sports.

In most discussions around these issues the biological basis of sex is still thought of as binary. That being said there is also evidence of a great deal of slippage and imprecision between notions of biological sex, a person's gender "identity", and their legal gender. It is occasionally difficult to establish precisely what is being disputed or the depth and breadth of some of the claims being made. Beneath the radar however it is clear that the binary basis of sex has begun to be challenged and several controversial articles in scientific publications have appeared in recent years. At the core of the argument is the expanding field of research into so called differences or disorders of sex development (DSDs) and the status and significance of Intersex people. 

To give some indication of the ground being covered and what "biological sex" here refers to, here is a concise summary from a review article in Nature from 2014: "Mammalian sex determination is the unique process whereby a single organ, the bipotential gonad, undergoes a developmental switch that promotes its differentiation into either a testis or an ovary. Disruptions of this complex genetic process during human development can manifest as disorders of sex development (DSDs)".

One of the first articles I've seen (also from the Nature website) which cites the notion of a spectrum of sex is Claire Ainsworth's informative summary of our broadening understanding of the developmental processes involved in biological sex from genetics, through endocrinology and anatomy. Although the data on these expanding bodies of knowledge is compelling she does not so much argue the claim that sex is a spectrum as assume it based on the very fact of the variety of intersex conditions. This is clearly question begging. The same can be said for a more recent article by Liza Brusman which presents some of the same data from the Ainsworth's article but with a far stronger emphasis on the spectrum interpretation and its possible political ramifications. 

For instance she suggests expanding the language of US civil rights law such as Title IX to include "all" sexes and genders. Though clearly to do that we would need to first settle on precisely what and how many new sexes we are talking about, and which Intersex conditions to append them to. Brusman though is adamant that society has to catch up: "The science is clear—sex is a spectrum".
Is this really the case? Does the diversity of DSDs and our broadening understanding of them at multiple levels of the human organism force us to conclude that sex is a spectrum?

It's worth noting that the category DSD is not some old-world received medical term designed to erase the hitherto unacknowledged existence of a spectrum of the sexes. It was in fact brought in with the Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders in 2006, which was the outcome of an international conference involving experts from a diversity of fields and patient advocates under the auspices of the Pediatric Endocrine Society and the European Society for Paediatric Endocrinology. 

It replaced otherwise unscientific and stigmatising terms such as pseudohermaphroditism, hermaphroditism and sex reversal from the accepted medical terminology. Despite this, some Intersex advocacy groups reject the term on the basis that 'disorder' remains stigmatising. DSDs are defined in the literature as “congenital conditions in which development of chromosomal, gonadal, or anatomic sex is atypical”. Nowhere in this medical literature is an argument made for DSDs constituting 'new' sexes.

As the most up-to-date of the writing on this subject concedes, the total proportion of live births with conditions falling under the general category of DSDs may amount to no more than 1-1.7%. Of these cases the vast majority consist of late onset (non-classical) Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, a condition caused by a deficiency in one of a number of enzymes involved in hormone production, and which only presents symptoms at puberty. The remaining proportion of DSDs include a wide range of genetic conditions, each impacting on an individual's appearance, fertility and development in different ways and to different degrees. Amanda Montañez' graphic demonstrates this quite neatly and has considerable didactic merit in this regard.   

To better answer the question (which by now the reader should recognise as very much a meta question) of whether DSDs constitute evidence of a spectrum of the sexes, we might start with asking what exactly IS a spectrum, and what is it the claim that sex is a spectrum is actually meant to do to our traditional understanding of sex as binary. To enquire in this way is not to question the science; the science is clear, there are lots of different DSDs and people with intersex characteristics as a consequence. This is a question about how a large body of scientific and medical research enters public consciousness and intersects with the demands and hopes of political activists and commentators. It is necessarily a question of interpretation.

Spectral Rhetoric in LGBT+ Discourse
Dictionaries are rarely reliable places to discover the meaning of terms as they are used in the heat of contemporary political disputes. It's a particularly pedantic trapping of Anglophone culture to demand strict consistency with dictionary definitions when engaged in argumentation. Anglo-Saxons are still resistant to the notion that the ultimate meaning of words come through their use, and similarly that the endless possibilities inherent in human practices consequently means that a word's definition can never be final. 

Nevertheless the Oxford English dictionary offers two definitions for spectrum: 1. a band of colours, as seen in a rainbow, produced by separation of the components of light by their different wavelengths. 2. Used to classify something in terms of its position on a scale between two extreme points.

The second of these definitions would seem to have obvious significance for describing biological sex as a spectrum, especially as it is visualised by Amanda Montañez in her graphic. The extreme points would be the typical biological male and typical biological female. And indeed it is at the extreme edges of her graphic that we find those positions. The first definition highlights that spectrum was first used in a scientific sense to classify the range of colours in the rainbow and later by extension the whole continuum of wavelengths of electro-magnetic radiation. The paradigmatic spectrum then is the rainbow, which is also the iconic flag of the LGBT+ movement. This is not without significance, nor is the fact that Montañez has used the rainbow as an indicative part of her graphic. The semiotics of the rainbow and by extension the way in which the term spectrum is used within LGBT+ discourse draws in a wide variety of inferences and associations which makes the claim about biological sex more complex than it seems.

The "spectrum model" of gender and sexuality is a much more familiar notion than a spectrum of the sexes. It's become a more common description as the range of sexual practices and gender identifications continues to diversify in Western societies. Dating apps are good place to get up to speed on the cutting edge ways in which many people identify themselves and their sexuality. In addition to hetero, homo and bisexuality it's not uncommon to see people identify as Queer, pansexual, sapiosexual, and even asexual. 

There are also intermediate and modal variations which signify that an individual may identify with two or more forms of sexuality. Or in the case of so-called homo and hetero-"flexibles" a person may have a general tendency but admit exceptions and not wish to identify as bisexual. Diversity is implicit in the iconography of the rainbow and is matched by the avowed openness of the LGBT+ movement to both non-conformity and change.  

The situation is at least if not more diverse in the case of gender, as the concept draws in a broader range of influences than just those involved with sexuality. The website Genderspectrum.org describes gender as involving a complex interrelationship between our experience of our body, our identity and society. It's arguable that each of these categories imply each other and indeed it would seem impossible to think of a personal identity that could exist without a social component. If there are no private languages then by extension that would seem to rule out private identities. Another way of thinking these three domains might be as the embodied, the personal, and the interpersonal. Gender identity - as the website states - is "our internal experience and naming of our gender. It can correspond to or differ from the sex we were assigned at birth".

We would expect the naming of our gender identity to also involve these three domains of experience. Names never exist in isolation and the signification of a gender identity is a matter of social contestation, appropriation and development. Think of how the notion of masculinity has been challenged, reasserted and reappraised during just the latter half of the 20th century. Think of how "traditional" ideas of womanhood have changed during the same period, often in response to developments in reproductive technologies or the wholesale entry of women into the workforces of Western economies. Indeed it is commonly held that "detraditionalisation", as it is known in the sociological literature, has been one of the principal drivers of diversification in the fields of gender and sexuality.

Like those traditional categories of man and woman, contemporary gender identities like non-binary, transgender, genderfluid and genderqueer are similarly rooted in social practices and so are never stable or fixed; further diversification and change is inevitable. The variety of sexual and gender identities are social facts, continuously emerging from the complex interplay of forces within modern societies. Analogous to the openness of language itself, conceiving gender and sexuality as spectra is a necessary correlate to the fact of human freedom and the capacity for change and diversification brought about though human practices. Another way of putting it is that their existence depends on the nature of the human as a free, acting and self-fashioning being.

Can we say the same for biological sex?

One of the many graphics illustrating the spectra of gender identity and sexuality. This one also includes biological sex.

One thing the LGBT+ movement has been extremely good at is contesting the hegemony of the so-called typical case. In sexuality this has traditionally been targeted at the assumption that heterosexuality is the norm (so-called heteronormativity). And in gender there have been significant advances in challenging social stereotypes associates with being a man or a woman, as well as the opening up of a myriad of gender non-conforming identities. Insofar as the rainbow is synonymous with the spectrum model, it signifies clearly that there is no typical case, no hegemonic norm. All positions within the spectrum are equally valid, and equality - especially in Law but also in terms of cultural legitimacy - are two of the principle political aims of LGBT+ activism and advocacy. 

This is the context and set of inferences brought to bear when it is argued that biological sex is also a spectrum. We could say then that to describe it as such is to claim biological sex territorially for the semiotics of LGBT+ discourse. It is to say that the things which are ordered within the observable range of biological sex are ordered in a way significantly similar to those things within the spectra of sexuality or gender. It is also to contest the hegemony of the norm, which in this case is the status of the "typical" biological male and female.

Unpicking the meaning of the attribute "spectrum" when used in this context helps us to understand the incongruities when it is applied to something like DSDs and biological sex more generally. The most important difference is this: DSDs like PMDS, 5-alpha reductase deficiency, and conditions caused by missing or additional sex chromosomes are not the product of human freedom and practice. They are not social facts. Before these conditions were discovered and their genetic basis understood they still existed. The biological basis of DSDs is not sustained by discourse and contestation; they are not brought into being by creative self fashioning. They are very different types of things to gender or sexual identities. 

There are also only so many DSDs (currently about 40 are known). Unlike the open ended nature of human practices they do not admit to the infinite realm of possibilities that we associate with the continuum of sexual and gender identities captured by the spectrum model. This is not to say that new DSDs won't be discovered or appear owing to natural genetic variation, but here we are clearly talking of discovery rather than creation.

The scientific significance of DSDs is undoubted. But scientific significance does not automatically equate to political significance, or at least the kind of political significance that neatly maps onto established strategies and forms of argumentation within the LGBT+ movement. As mentioned above, one of the signal functions of LGBT+ activism is to contest the validity of hegemonic norms and assert the equality of all members within the spectrum of identities. This is problematic in the case of biological sex for at least two reasons. 

Firstly, even Montañez's graphic marks biological male and female as the typical cases to which all the DSDs are related. Indeed it's questionable whether any of the "gradations" she visualises can be thought of independently of their relation to one or both of those typical cases. This is especially so as each of the DSDs included are caused by genetic defects of what would otherwise have been a typical case.

To better illustrate this point lets go back to the spectrum of sexual identities. Let's consider Sapiosexual, which is someone who identifies with being particularly attracted to intelligence. In order to understand this do we need to make reference to other identities within the spectrum? Seemingly not. Aside from a general understanding of what a sexual identity is Sapiosexual is perfectly intelligible without reference to other points on the spectrum. Indeed even if there were no other sexual identities Sapiosexual would still be intelligible in every significant way. It is a discrete member of the set of sexual identities. This however is not the case with DSDs. Each condition by its nature is a specific variation from the typical observed case and this is reflected in the names given to many DSDs such as "deficiencies", "dysgenesis", "disorders" etc.

Secondly, there is I think a strong claim that Montañez's graphic and much of the popular writing which uses DSDs to claim that sex is a spectrum misrepresents the data. It is always worth remembering that the way complex scientific data is presented goes a long way when making arguments that revolve around interpretation. It is undeniable that the way the graphic is presented - especially with the inclusion of the rainbow strip on which are listed the names of various DSDs - calls out "spectrum". But this is only one way of showing the data and perhaps it is missing a very important component, weighting. 

Outline of the 21-Hydroxylase deficient variant of CAH
As already mentioned the total range of DSDs may account for only 1-1.7% of live births and that perhaps only 0.2% are made up of conditions other than Late Onset Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH). That means that the genetically and physiologically typical cases make up at worst over 98%. When you take into consideration people with Late Onset CAH are karyotypically normal and experience no physical symptoms until puberty, you are left with a figure of around 1 in 500 live births potentially showing some signs of DSDs. Also worth noting is that the cases of ambiguous genitalia - the DSD that gets most coverage in popular media - affects an estimated 1 in 4500 births.

If this weighting were taken into account the graphic would look very different indeed. The typical biological male and female, which in Montañez's version form the extreme ends of her spectrum would, when weighted correctly, look like brick sized slices of bread between which an ultra wafer-thin slice of cheese would be located representing the totality of DSDs. Would a non-specialist looking at such a graphic be likely to conclude that biological sex exists as a spectrum? I suggest this is unlikely and what such a weighted visualisation would instead do would be to emphasise that biological sex is only intelligible as a binary, but that there also exist a small minority of exceptions to the typical cases, which are of wide ranging types. 

However, those exceptions are only explainable as exceptions by relation to the typical binary cases. Androgen insensitivity is only observable owing to the fact of the typical level of "sensitivity" being understood; just as mutations in CYP21A2 or SRD5A2 genes are only understood owing to the sequence for the functioning enzymes they code for being known from the typical cases. None of the conditions falling under the category of DSDs are defensible as discrete sexes in their own right. They are quite simply different kinds of things to gender and sexual identities and to treat them as if they were not is nonsensical.

I said above that the 2nd definition of spectrum - to classify something in terms of its position on a scale between two extreme points - might superficially have greater applicability to biological sex. At least this notion of spectrum acknowledges the validity of the extreme points; something the continuum version of spectrum - the one used when we talk about sexuality and gender - does not. It does however make little sense to claim that DSDs represent "gradations" between the typical biological male and female that can be used to plot a scale from one to the other. 

Each condition has its own specific aetiology and characteristics at the genetic, hormonal and physiological level. Classifying them as more or less male or female is a forced abstraction that is rooted neither in the science or the way in which these conditions are approach from a practical medical standpoint. And even if one could in some remote way describe the distribution visualised by Montanez as having genuine "spectrum-like" qualities it is still less than obvious what the political significance and benefits of this might be for those individuals who could be described as belonging to one or more new non-binary sexes.

What are the Political Implications?
So what are some of the political implications at stake here? What would be the virtue of arguing for a spectrum of the sexes and how might such an interpretation impact current advocacy issues around Intersex people?

Homosexuality used to be considered a illness with potential criminal tendencies; it was treated "medically" with drugs and torturous treatments like electric shocks. Despite homosexuality being legalised in the UK in 1967 it wasn't until 1987 that it was fully removed as a "mental disturbance" from the DSM (The American directory of mental disorders). Depathologizing homosexuality was a big step towards reducing social stigma and paving the way for gay rights in areas such as anti-discrimination law and most recently marriage. 

DSDs, however, are by definition disorders, their cause is traceable to anomalies in the building blocks of life, our DNA, and can result in extreme cases (as with the salt-wasting variant of Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia) in life threatening illness. As genuine medical conditions many of them demand some kind of appropriate, compassionate medical response, and it is not at all clear how depathologising them under the rubric of a new spectrum of the sexes would benefit people born with DSDs.

A great deal of Intersex advocacy does focus on healthcare responses. One area where there is a considerable amount of work being done is in the area of laws protecting the bodily integrity of intersex people, especially where it concerns non-consensual genital surgeries, sometimes called "assigned sex". This is to do with those rare cases of babies born with so-called ambiguous genitalia and the medical responses that ensue. In many cases there is little in the way of ambiguity and the child's sex is not in dispute. Surgery might take place - for example in boys - because the genitals are not considered "male" enough. This has resulted in cases where new born boys have had their penises removed and been raised as girls, sometimes only finding out the truth much later in life.
The Phall-O-Meter, developed in the 1990s by the Intersex Society of North America (ISNA), was a satirical activism tool to highlight how doctors made subjective judgements about atypical genitalia then based their surgical advice on that analysis. From Human Rights Watch Website
There is also evidence that in cases of serious ambiguity the tendency in the past has been to surgically create genitals that appear male, thus effacing many women at birth.  Intersex advocacy tends to focus on delaying non-consensual and irreversible surgeries until an intersex person reaches the age of informed consent. From a consent perspective there seems to be little that is added by way of arguing for a spectrum of the sexes.

There is also little evidence that the interpretation of sex as a spectrum is being driven by Intersex people themselves. The decision in Germany in 2013 to allow some Intersex infants to be classified as a third sex was roundly criticised by rights groups and Intersex advocates. There is a concern that allowing a newborn child to be registered as a third sex would encourage more surgeries on intersex infants as parents are unlikely to feel comfortable with the uncertainty. Many countries also have sex based rights legislation or link access to certain welfare provisions to sex . Subsequently, Intersex people classified other than male or female may well fall between the cracks while legislators attempt to catch up with the new non-binary system.

Thinking of DSDs as constituting sexes in their own right would also appear to reverse the famous anti-reductionist mantra that "genes are not destiny". Now it appears to some extent they are. You are your persistent Mullerian duct syndrome, your defective androgen receptors, your ambiguous genitalia. Your hidden fallopian tubes are the secret of your true nature rather than just a rare and slightly Lovecraftian result of a point mutation in a single gene.

Is there any reason to believe that people with Turner or Klinefelter syndrome need to be classified as a unique sex in order to access specific legal rights and protections that are currently unavailable to them, or that this would lead to a better quality of life? Many of the conditions categorised as DSDs do not result in symptoms that put the sex of the person into question. MRKH affects genetic females and causes incomplete development of the uterus, cervix and/or vagina. Though they do have normal ovaries, people with MRKH are sterile. Being told that such a condition means you are not a biological female doesn't sound like a very progressive move. 

The same could be said of Klinefelter syndrome which involves a genetic male having an additional X chromosome. Symptoms are often subtle and hard to detect even after the onset of puberty. Would such a person benefit from being classed as other than male at birth? And finally, would social justice in general be served by treating biological sex as a spectrum rather than binary? These are the sorts of questions which are as yet unanswered by advocates of the spectrum interpretation.

There is an assumption among many radical social constructivists and theorists of detraditionalization that any increase in indeterminacy or breakdown of hegemonic norms is by definition emancipatory. There seems to be little reason to take this for granted. It is perhaps worth bearing in mind the fact/value distinction; the distinction between "is" and "ought" which captures the difference between scientific claims and value or ethical claims. 

The value claims made (or assumed) from interpreting biological sex as a spectrum do not necessarily follow from the facts, and need to be argued for on their own merits rather than asserted on the basis of their applicability for gender identity and sexuality. Traditional LGBT+ activism may well have an important role to play as an ally in advocating against unnecessary surgery, especially where such surgery has tended to favour "masculinisation" of ambiguous genitalia; or in resisting the impact of gender stereotypes on Intersex people whose conditions mean they don't necessarily fit the mould. 

There is however a potential conflict as currently one major aspect of trans-rights is arguing for access to precisely the kind of medical interventions (hormone treatment and surgery) that many Intersex advocates are trying to minimise. We live at a time where public self-assertion and group-think often run ahead of a cool examination of the facts and the implications of drawing communities with markedly different concerns into already matured forms of political activism and ideology. How the current articulation of medical interventionism and identity politics would impact Intersex people if the spectrum interpretation prevails is unclear. In any case we might well question whether dragging individuals with a complex range of conditions into the current culture war is at all desirable.

Thursday, 27 February 2020

Contrivances of Pessimism? The Conspiracy Against the Human Race by Thomas Ligotti


How to live well in a world that is dying? Increasingly this question preoccupies me. It is a question that is directed in the most radical way at what is most our own, our sense of historicality, of being part of a continuity that exists beyond any one individual, or even perhaps any single community or nation. The significance of the dying world is not immediately ethical but ontological. It disrupts at the base of things, the base on which most if not all our commonplace notions about what it is to live are grounded. Finitude for instance is hard enough to appropriate to oneself in the context of an otherwise cosy continuity of things. How many more times will you watch the full moon rise? It all seems so endless, but in truth the number is perhaps quite small. How then to reconcile such a "personal" relationship to the finite with finitude on the scale of All Things?  Let us then call radical finitude the subjective disposition that identifies one's own finitude with the finitude of the world, and does so by forging a form-of-life appropriate to it. This form-of-life born from out of the wreckage of "last days capitalism" and ecological collapse is the task for anyone who accepts the veracity of the doom of our time and chooses to stay alive amid the gathering ruins.

Pessimism? Possibly, but its catching; not as contagious as Coronavirus but almost certainly more socially unacceptable. God knows we need articulate expressions of pessimism right now as the prevailing cheery disposition of neoliberalism saturates our culture with sloganistic admonishments to LIVE YOUR BEST LIFE! Some of us would be satisfied with a passably happy death, or if not happy, then at least not scrabbling around in our own shit gasping for breath as the experts circle and the Muzak drones on. We struggle to appropriate it yet there is no cure for finitude, and thank your lucky stars for that, as chances are if there were it wouldn't be available on your level of medical insurance. Most attempts at immortality are reserved for the rich, hence all the cosmetic surgeons in Beverly Hills. As contenders for useful pessimistic literature go, this item for consideration recently came across my desk.

Thomas Ligotti - The Conspiracy Against the Human Race: A Contrivance of Horror
Penguin Books 2018 (originally published 2010 by Hippocampus Press, New York, NY)

Thomas Ligotti is principally known as a writer of supernatural horror stories and - in 2016 - one of only two living authors to have had their work published in Penguin Classics. That the second author is Morrissey may or may not be construed to take some shine off the accolade. Unlike his collection, Songs of a Dead Dreamer & Grimscribe, this book is not fiction. It peaked my interest as a purported expression of philosophical pessimism, for which I have some interest. However, I was aware of Ligotti's avowed condition as an anhedonic recluse with a long history of anxiety and depression, and was hoping he'd provide more than just a projective rationalisation for his own unenviable situation. Unfortunately, what he has produced is a work of confusing extremes and by his own admission paradoxes.

There is a lot more going on in the book than a straightforward expression of philosophical pessimism, of which there are numerous strains and degrees. In the first instance this is not really a work of philosophy, indeed at times he's explicit about his disdain for philosophical systems and even logical argumentation. He isn't trying to teach you anything you shouldn't already know; at least, that is, if you share his pessimistic outlook, which he claims quite early on to be rooted ultimately in a individual's innate disposition rather than any rational assessment of things as they are. Given that belief, one almost wonders why he bothered to author a book of this kind since by his own assessment he's either preaching to the converted or appealing to the unhearing masses of deluded happy people. Most of the text is actually an attempt to append a lot of other claims upon his basic pessimistic outlook, including anti-natalism (which despite what he suggests does not flow necessarily from all forms of pessimism), determinism and an odd sort of anti-egoism, in which he claims that the delusion of selfhood ranks highest in the hierarchy of fabrications that compose our lives. As if things weren't bad enough!

Pessimism, philosophical or otherwise has been a rich seam of thought for many centuries and has substantially helped define what philosophy (at least in its continental guise) is today. Though to read Ligotti's book you'd think that all the best writing in this vein had been done by the later part of the 19th century. The most important exception in terms of his argument (such as it is) is a short obscure work by the Norwegian Peter Zapffe, The Last Messiah (1933), which the author introduces us to early in proceedings.

Zapffe's text is mostly a highly rhetorical refashioning of Freud's theses from Civilisation and Its Discontents, with some crude Darwinian flourishes and antique pop psychology thrown in for good measure. The function of culture, which in Freud's essay is framed as a means to draw us away from our savage tendencies - though at the price of making us all neurotic - is in the Norwegian's version a kind of mass deception, keeping human beings with their tragically overdeveloped consciousness from confronting the truth of their bare, meaningless, biological existence. When these cultural strategies, which Zapffe glosses as Isolation, Anchoring, Distraction and Sublimation fail, we are thrown into despair. Or as he puts it: "The dread of being stares us in the eye, and in a deadly gush we perceive how the minds are dangling in threads of their own spinning, and that a hell is lurking underneath". You can see why a horror writer might be attracted to this and I suppose he's entitled to his pet miserablist. Zapffe is the intellectual bare bones upon which Ligotti hangs the lion's share of the book, most of the work of which is done by the end of the long first chapter titled The Nightmare of Being, in which he applies the learning of Zapffe to subjects as wide ranging as Buddhism, science-fiction films, cognitive psychology and a somewhat implausible phenomena called "ego-death".

One of the difficulties of Ligotti's exposition is that he consistently conflates the tradition and propositions of so-called “negative thought” – an anti-dialectical current running through late 19th century philosophy, in particular the writings of Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche – with a more common or psychological pessimism which has occasionally been termed “depressive realism”. The latter maintains that non-depressed people hold a “positivity bias” which colours their general outlook, whereas the supposed “negativity bias” of the depressive actually gives a more realistic appraisal of the world. I would argue that most of the opinions expressed in the book (especially those on politics and psychology) emanate from a position of depressive realism rather than a philosophically informed negativity or pessimism, and it’s this which accounts for the at times heavy handed or just plainly dismissive approach the author takes. This is shown clearly in his discussion of emotion which he declares to be the "substrate for the illusion of being a somebody among somebodies", merely "living arbitrarily". And here he make a key distinction: "to live falsely as pawns of affect, or to live factually as depressives, or as individuals who know what is known to the depressive" (p104).

Plainly then Ligotti feels his depressive state gives him an advantage, though the empirical research into this claim has found little evidence. Moreover, does the mere capacity to feel emotion render life arbitrary? Intuitively this seems false. Most people have a fairly good handle on how they react to particular situations and our perception of a person's personality and character is largely dependent on a degree of consistent affective response. If we are such false and arbitrary creatures why is genuine personal change considered to be such a hard thing to achieve?

What strikes the reader throughout the book is the vehemence of Ligotti's exposition, and its hard generalisations. For instance, even the central concept of pessimism is for the author very black and white: "People are either pessimists or optimists. They forcefully "lean" one way or the other, and there is no common ground between them. For pessimists, life is something that should not be, which means that what they believe should be is the absence of life, nothing, non-being, the emptiness of the uncreated" (pg30). This is the extreme position that the author takes with him for his subsequent survey of an idiosyncratic selection of traditions, scientific disciplines and phenomena. It's as if he felt he could only undertake this work from the position of an uber-pessimist, the effect of which is to invalidate from the get-go most of what he covers as "just not pessimistic enough". This is perhaps symptomatic of the above mentioned dichotomy he sets up between preaching to the converted and "happy idiots".

Schopenhauer, for instance - whose general sentiment he approves of - is otherwise dismissed, owing to his unwieldy philosophical system and assertion of his concept of the "Will-to-live"; just another "intellectual labyrinth for specialists in perplexity", according to Ligotti, showing an unendearing anti-intellectualism. There's virtually nothing from the existentialist tradition beyond Schopenhauer, perhaps for the good reason that many of those philosophies accept Ligotti's axiomatic view of the objective meaninglessness of human existence, but go on to produce works which nevertheless avoid the extreme conclusions Ligotti believes follow naturally from that first premise. The philosophies of Heidegger, Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty all start with the existence (or facticity) of human beings as a meaningless negativity, or 'thrown-ness' to use Heidegger's term in translation.

There is undoubtedly some just plain nasty posturing in the book. Ligotti's attitude to environmentalism is one example, which he considers a "barricade" against the facts of life; a cause "that snubs the real issue. Vandalism of the environment is but a sidebar to humanity's refusal to look into the jaws of existence" (pg64). Now, one could try to claim this was a poorly articulated variant of Heidegger's critique of technology, which views the destruction of the natural world as an extension of the "forgetting of Being". But that would be granting to Ligotti far too much. In truth the book is littered with grumpy expressions of this kind, which seem grounded in little else than the author's desire to shock. Despite what Ligotti may think, the 'Disenchantment of the World' - to use Max Weber's famous expression - is not fresh news to the average educated reader. Given the prognosis it's surprising he didn't use the global climate crisis as a more materialist grounding for his outlook. Radical finitude and apocalypse have no place in his pessimistic ontology.

It's possible that the unusual force of his exposition is due to it being composed from within the American context, home to widespread fundamentalisms of all shades and where his most basic claims would undoubtedly shock a significant proportion of the population. From the thoroughly disenchanted and disillusioned shores of Europe, however, he appears like a man battering down an open door.

While Ligotti is content to diminish the ontological stability of the self through his commitment to determinism and denial of the existence of the ego (Jacques Lacan would support him here), his nihilism stops short at fields which produce results that chime with his world view; these primarily being 19th century psychiatry and modern cognitive science.

Accordingly, the self is a fabrication comparable to those other empty distractions he lists such as religion, the Nation and the family. Science is apparently not such a fabrication or distraction. Though one might well question what sort of science is possible without a degree of ontological stability for the knower. If we cannot even be certain about the status of the self, then any knowledge of the external world and by extension, any possible science, seems on very shaky ground. When it comes to epistemology Ligotti is a highly selective Pyrrhonian skeptic, unequivocal about the groundless nature of our intuitions, our sense of self and any feelings that life might be ok. Yet when it comes to cognitive science, evolutionary biology and 19th century psychiatry he's happy to take many of their knowledge claims at face value, though often with regret that they're not pessimistic enough. Where is the epistemological ground upon which the claims of these fields are based? And indeed, following Zapffe, is not all science just another distraction, another story we're telling ourselves about ourselves to avoid the dark truth of the "MALIGNANTLY USELESS" (Ligotti's capitalisation) rut of being in which we exist?

There is a strong sense that in all this he insists too much, and there is a great deal of repetition and hyperbole in many of his observations. The book is also bereft of anything by way of structure, which given its tone makes it a less than pleasant reading experience. Each chapter drifts rather arbitrarily between popular culture, science and literature without ever reaching a conclusion. This all changes for the final chapter, Autopsy on a Puppet: an Anatomy of the Supernatural. Here it's as if a curtain has been pulled back and light allowed into a dusty old room. For the final quarter of the book Ligotti's tone changes markedly, ditching the posturing and instead embarking on a mini history of supernatural horror fiction. Here he writes fluidly and positively about his chosen field and its antecedents, from Ann Radcliffe in the late 18th century through Poe, Lovecraft, and even forays into Shakespeare and the works of Joseph Conrad. There are some interesting observations about the role of "atmosphere" in Schopenhauer and how it links with a sense that "behind the scenes of life there is something pernicious that makes a nightmare of our world" (p175). In another register the desire to find out just what that "something" is became a highly prominent feature of late 19th and early 20th century Western thought and is sometimes referred to as "the hermeneutics of suspicion". It is an epithet frequently applied to the works of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, all of whom were arguably pessimists, though in different ways.

There is little else to say about the book except to highlight another paradox of this author. In an interview Ligotti gave in the wake of the book's original publication in 2011 he claimed to identify as a socialist and argued that a concern for justice was paramount, especially where the issue of reducing suffering was at stake. And yet here the same author writes: "Both the inhumane and humane movements of our species are without relevance. None of us are at the helm of either of these moments. We believe ourselves to be masters of our behaviour - that is the blunder" (p226).
Quite how he can square his commitment to socialism with this statement and the whole gamut of other dead-end positions he takes in The Conspiracy Against the Human Race is anyone's guess. From the perspective of his commitment to determinism, where is the sense in talking about justice and injustice? And from the perspective of the pessimist, where would the motivation even come from to attempt to change things as they stand, let alone institute some (admittedly rather palliative) form of socialism? As he repeatedly says, we are just deluded puppets. Taking all Ligotti's positions together at face value leaves us with neither knowledge of the self or the outside world, nor the will to get out of bed to open the front door in order to find out. No political program could possibly emerge from it.

This is undoubtedly a book of paradoxes which is often frustrating and at times hard to take seriously. I would not recommend it for anyone interested in the tradition of philosophical pessimism. It clearly reflects Ligotti's interests and his psychology but makes no attempt to argue a coherent position or address up-to-date scholarship. I'm left wishing he'd dedicated more time to his reflections on the history of supernatural horror, which I found insightful and far more readable than what had gone before. Perhaps the joke is on us and the cranked up nihilism (which elsewhere he refutes) and no-holds-barred pessimism is an attempt at a new kind of horror literature. Undoubtedly some passages do stick in the memory, though I'm not sure they do so for the right reasons. I'm reminded of Jhonn Balance: Why be bleak when you can be Blake? The question of a form-of-life suitable to our world remains very much open.

Thursday, 2 January 2020

Round-up of Reviews at Musique Machine

Six reviews from the end of 2019 and the start of this year at Musique Machine.

Broken_Canyon - Drain
We Could Die Here - Self Titled
Achim Zepezauer + Guests - Kuhzunft:Slotmachine
Tim Collins & Reiko Goto with Chris Malcolm - PLEIN AIR - Silva Datum Musica
Michael Lightborne - Sounds of the Projection Box
Yoshimi - Fragile


Saturday, 31 August 2019

Six new reviews and an Interview with Leyland James Kirby

Been busy with getting/starting a new job and training for a sports event, so I've been limited to music journalism only over the last few months. Very happy to have interviewed Leyland James Kirby (the Caretaker, the Stranger, VVM) as his music has been an inspiration ever since I first heard Selected Memories from the Haunted Ballroom back in 2001. Was also delighted to review Roger Doyle's new record, which coincided with his election to Saoi in Aosdána, the highest award open to an Irish artist. And I've also started a series of reviews of music roughly grouped under "post-Vaporwave", starting with releases from 2814, Wuso 命 and a collaboration between 猫 シ Corp. & Telepath.


From Out of the Past - An Interview with Leyland James Kirby (The Caretaker)


David Rothenberg - Nightingale Cities

Vallmo - Ruin Walls

Roger Doyle - The Electrification of Night

2814 - Pillar / New Sun

Wuso 命 - Lonely Streets

猫 シ Corp. & T e l e p a t h - Building a Better World