Showing posts with label Culture Wars. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Culture Wars. Show all posts

Monday, 1 January 2024

Concepts of Post-Liberal Politics: Activist Bureaucracy?

 I've seen this term popping up with increasing regularity on Twitter, mainly associated with conservative discourse around the influence of "woke" ideas on State institutions. It appears to be a mostly Anglophone phenomenon, following in the wake of culture wars around gender, so-called critical race theory in schools and universities, and issues around immigration and crime. It initially struck me as something of a misnomer since the two terms, activist and bureaucracy, usually denote two distinct relationships to institutions and two distinct positions within Liberal democratic politics. 

 


The Tweets above in part continue a longstanding tradition on the Right of associating State bureaucracy with both the Left generally and with anti-democratic tendencies within the Liberal State itself. Perhaps the classic statement of this position was made by arch free-marketeer and Ordoliberal, Ludwig Von Mises in his On Bureaucracy (1944), where this father of Neoliberalism blamed government suppression of the profit motive through regulation (and New Deal style welfarism) for the rise of bureaucracy in the US. The association, however, with political activism adds a contemporary spin, perhaps emanating from out of recent US social conflicts, such as the Black Lives Matter protests in 2020. The association of activism and established state bureaucracy might also reflect the dominance of Post-War US political culture more generally, in which the Left has traditionally been most effective in the form of activist movements rather than organised party type structures which have had greater impact in the UK and Europe.

The idea of activist bureaucracy also signals a number of currents in Western political culture around the legitimacy of institutions and fears around an ideological or anti-democratic 'capture' of State functions which are meant to be nominally neutral. In the UK it's now commonplace to hear of universities, the health service, or other such public body being "captured" by activists. What this claim seem to imply is that the public body in question has ceased to function as an expression of the general will or common good and instead espouses an ideological position (i.e. particularistic), with consequent policies negatively affecting those who do not subscribe to the ideology in question. This view is strongly associated with criticisms around Cancel Culture and the influence of diversity, inclusion and equality initiatives within those same institutions. 

Despite the above now being a fairly well understood current in contemporary Western politics there is still something intuitively jarring about the articulation of activism and bureaucratic modes of organisation, especially in the context of struggles around gender and race, which given their emotional, and - in the case of gender - highly speculative nature, would not seem to lend themselves to the form of rational, rules based managerial techniques associated with bureaucracy. Then again if the Party/State bureaucracy of the USSR or contemporary China are expressions of those States interpretations of Marxist/Leninist thought (something the Right never ceases to deride as the epitome of ideologically driven politics), then the necessary association of rational management with neutrality would appear less secure. 

But perhaps this is the central point and the reason the notion of an activist bureaucracy garners so much online rancour from garden variety conservatives and right leaning Liberals hankering after the good old days of free speech and "rigorous debate". In short, the appearance of an ideologically driven, evangelical (I actually think this better expresses the phenomenon than the term activist) bureaucratic State apparatus within the framework of liberal democracy puts into question long standing assumptions about the rational, scientific, and value neutral quality of modern State administration. It reveals to the based dissident or red pilled conservative that there is really no such thing as neutrality, and the collapse of the centre ground, rather than eclipsing universalist one-nation government, actually reveals that government as always-already partial, partisan and particularistic in nature. This is the reasoning at the heart of so much chatter about the deep State and the limits of electoral democracy to really influence the course of events.

Marxists have long understood that what the ruling class calls common sense is only the ideologically driven worldview of the dominant property owning classes. Free market Liberal economic doctrine had this character to it, at least until the financial crash of the late 2000s, and is still pushed by elements within mainstream political parties, despite the last fifteen years of near flat growth as a result of the casino going broke. Imputing an 'ideological' character to the beliefs of one's political enemies is a commonplace strategy as much on the Right as it is on the Left. We always wish to believe our side has a better grasp of reality, whereas our opponents only deal in pipe dreams and mystification. In doing so we immediately devalue the political aims and methods of the other side, so much so that any attempt to find common ground would be futile. Thus the common sense / ideology opposition is a real political antagonism that cannot be resolved within the deliberative mechanisms of the Liberal State.

Consequently this adds a sharp edge to the accusations around activist (read ideologically driven, partisan) bureaucracy. Since what is at stake is a battle over different visions of reality, there can be no debate or political resolution which might find a mutually acceptable compromise. There simply isn't enough common ground. We see this absolute polarisation at work in all the major social struggles of the day, whether it's trans activists claiming critics of "gender affirmative healthcare" are supporting genocide; or opponents of mass immigration accusing lawyers and human rights activists of engineering the replacement of white Europeans. The lack of a leading political culture to suppress these extremes while mediating between different value claims and forms-of-life is one of the reasons all social conflict now looks like a life or death struggle.

One thing all sides have in common, which rises to the surface in fears about activist bureaucracy - and to a lesser extent Leftist paranoia about institutional bias and hidden Fascist agendas, is the latent Western myth of a neutral and benign civil power which somehow rises above the multitude of value claims and competing forms-of-life to resolve, like a beautifully engineered machine of governance, all those conflicts that threaten to dissolve the commonwealth. Everyone wants the administrative state to rule according to principles of sound rational governance, for its authority to be generally recognised, and its decisions to be accepted as Just. But this is a fantasy, because at a time of crisis above all what we want is for the administration to rule in our favour, and if it doesn't then it simply can't be rational or neutral or Just. 

We live at a time when all authority is being put into question by the pace of technological and sociological change, its foundations creaking and crumbling, its officials impotent against forces they cannot control and seem not to understand. Human scale authority, in which individuals recognise themselves and their communities, and is accepted as legitimate by a majority of the governed, no longer exists in the West. In its place has appeared the figure of the digital swarm and of global civil war, a conflict where the belligerents traverse national boundaries, can consist of a single lone wolf or an army of tens of thousands, and where weapons range from words on social media, to legal suits, to HR policies, to Kamikaze drones and ballistic missiles.

All the old certainties and boundaries are dissolved, the myths by which we formerly governed ourselves no longer hold sway. One thing is sure, that no-one anymore cares much for democracy. Whether you're a gender critical campaigner trying to get "gender ideology" out of schools, or a racial justice activist wanting compulsory unconscious bias training in all government departments, your aim is not to win at the ballot box or put forward a program for public scrutiny. Your aim is to bend the vast invasive power of modern State administration to implement your will without recourse to the messy and less certain process of consensus building. Everyone wants their Caesar in HR. We are uncontrollable societies of disaffected individuals, as the late Bernard Stiegler put it. It is only in this context can the seeming misnomer of activist bureaucracy be understood.

Sunday, 12 February 2023

Enough Rainbow Flogging!

 

Just as the pandemic was getting started in 2020 I wrote a long essay about the contentious issue of whether biological sex was binary or existed as a spectrum. This was a response to a lot of noise around this subject that I’d been seeing on the fringes of what we now know as the gender, or trans wars. Part of that piece included an analysis of the meaning of spectrum as it appears in the rhetorical and sign strategies of LGBT activism. The rainbow - I argued - was the paradigmatic spectrum and the most readily identifiable symbol of LGBT discourse, whether as a flag carried by participants on a Pride march or used as a marker on products, literature or anything else. Describing biological sex as a spectrum was then a sort of territorial claim packaged with a cluster of associations which disrupted normative thinking around sexual dimorphism and the idea of the typical case, in a similar way that the expanding list of labels for sexuality and gender identity disrupt normative understanding of those categories.

I think an addendum to this analysis is in order on account of the way in which the use of the rainbow symbol has metastasised over the last three years. Very few people in the Anglophone world (as always it's worth noting that these phenomena reach their greatest intensity in those countries - at the vanguard of Decline) could fail to have noticed the massive expansion of the rainbow symbol beyond its common association with LGBT activism. We've come to a point where it's now hard to avoid encountering it in any number of incongruous locations. For example one might traverse a rainbow painted road crossing (displacing the traditional 'Zebra' black and white design) in Chiswick or Ealing. Are these places especially in need of ostentatious symbols of inclusivity?  Do they have a known lack of diversity or history of discrimination against LGBT identifying people? The intention is opaque. If you visit a hospital or other NHS facility you're positively rainbow bombed by murals, information leaflets, signage and the now ubiquitous - and slightly threatening - rainbow adjacent imperative BE KIND. In addition to these publically funded examples you're also likely to come across private businesses making a strong show of their 'allyship' or status as a Stonewall accredited LGBT employer, replete with bright and shiny rainbow graphics. So, why all the rainbow flogging?

In my analysis in 2020 I drew attention to the use within LGBT activist discourse of the concept of "spectrum" and of the rainbow as the paradigmatic spectrum. On the one hand the rainbow with its multiple colours highlights diversity and inclusivity. All are welcome under its umbrella, and - as the concept of spectrum indicates - the symbol is able to accommodate an infinite multitude of non-conforming and emergent identities. In addition to diversity and inclusion the rainbow also symbolises equity, that all members within the spectrum are equal and there is no place for normative categories of any kind. No-one has the right to claim normative supremacy against which the others are but lesser variations. Everyone is a winner, everyone should be celebrated. Taken as a whole the rainbow stakes a claim for a form of totality - albeit of a rather circular kind. It is a circle of mutual celebration and normative dissolution where the members are considered equal but without singular consequence. It is a flag under which you can be whoever you want to be, but all you will ever amount to is an equal in an otherwise free-floating and boundless community. The burning of a thousand minor stars is blinding.

There are I think at least two main highways through which the rainbow has come to symbolise this new totality. The first should be familiar. During the pandemic the child-like painted rainbow became the symbol not only of collective support for health workers, but of collective conformity with government restrictions. During my many long walks in 2020 I would see this rainbow in windows beyond which lived people terrified to leave their homes. I saw it marked in chalk on pavements next to spray painted signs to KEEP YOUR DISTANCE installed by local councils. I saw it in the gaudy lights of giant advertising boards in Piccadilly circus, on the sides of busses and in stations. The rainbow came to mark a boundary and a sign of allegiance. You were either compliant and clapped the good people of the NHS and the government trying to protect the vulnerable, or you were with the MAGA conspiracists, the death cultists, the anti-vax 5G proto-fascists. Quite a dichotomy set up there, but it was one fuelled by politicians for over two years, and that particular piece of divide and rule has only continued into the latest round of crises. And herein lies the crux of the matter.

 


The NHS is collapsing. In some respects we no longer have accessible public healthcare in the UK. Certainly many people, myself included, no longer bother trying to access it unless it's a question of life and death. Over 10% of the UK population is currently waiting for NHS treatment and the average waiting time for an ambulance is such that if you were to suffer a stroke, heart attack, or be involved in serious car accident you are most likely to die on the street. As I have written before, comprehensive public health was abandoned during the pandemic in favour of a war economy aimed at one eminently survivable disease. The damage caused has been vast and will only worsen, since not only have many NHS services never returned to pre-pandemic levels, we now have a population wracked by physical and metal ill health, the direct consequence of being confined to their homes and having their social existence decimated by wrongheaded and entirely short-sighted authoritarian policies. We  now also have rampant inflation, the combined result of disrupted supply chains (again due to the pandemic response) and the decision of European nations to shoot themselves in the foot by weaponising energy supplies in their now open conflict with Russia in Ukraine.

The second highway towards total-rainbow has been the mainstreaming of the gender wars at the same time gender activism has been making major inroads into State and third sector institutions. The main protagonists of the latter in the UK have been transgender organisations Mermaids and Gendered Intelligence, and the establishment LGBT+ organisation Stonewall, whose Diversity Champions Program and associated Workplace Equality Indices have come under scrutiny for among other things misrepresenting the UK Equality Act. There are however a whole host of advocacy/activist and associated gender-conventicles working across the economy, all using similar rhetoric and symbolism, including variations on the ubiquitous rainbow.

At a time of such self evident decline it's hardly surprising that the rainbow sticking plaster, with its infantile imperative BE KIND has conquered all before it. People have every reason to be angry; they are being taxed for services they cannot access and are freezing and starving to death in order to maintain American global hegemony. Western Governments have done little else over the past few years but sell out to big tech and big pharma, while at the same time annihilating the societal base upon which their populations may have been able to self organise and resist. We are angry, disenchanted and atomised. Our politicians have no answers to the grand problems facing post-industrial societies in climate collapse.

The rainbow provides a convenient image with built in semiotic slippage. Its ability both to totalise and to divide inside from outside make it invaluable - as it was during the pandemic - to rally people behind its nebulous cause, and stifle opposition. When after waiting weeks for a doctor's appointment you finally get to the overcrowded surgery only to find your appointment has been cancelled owing to staff shortages your understandable frustration is confronted by the sign fixed to the plastic screen (another retain from pandemic days) in front of the reception desk. It tells you 'We take a zero tolerance approach to any abuse of our staff". The words are ringed by a rainbow above which reads BE KIND. The reality being presented to you here is clear; you're either with the good guys, the cult of permanent celebration, that waits quietly masked up for treatment that'll never arrive, or you're the proto-fascist horde, the anti-vax thug, the deplorable superspreader event with bells on that deserves nothing from our entirely faultless and virtuous welfare system.

Pull back and apply the same logic to other situations where the rainbow appears like a warning. Whether you're an employee uncomfortable about being told to add your pronouns to your email signature, or a teacher unwilling to teach children about the existence of hundreds of gender identities, or just anyone going about your business only to be confronted by this new creed, this unspoken symbol of your compelled compliance, the rainbow makes clear you are either with us or against us. The rainbow has been radicalised and now represents a boundary permitting the distinction between insiders and outsiders. In a collapsing civilisation diversity, equity and inclusion becomes just another cudgel, another way to govern the ungovernable.

Interestingly, the emergence of the rainbow as a symbol of political kitsch coincides with its collapse as a symbol of unity in LGBT politics. The rise over the last two years of alternative activist frameworks which diverge from Stonewall's monopolistic approach is a sign that the reality of conflict between interests and the limits of facile liberal universalism are beginning to be felt. The Progress Pride flag is perhaps the strongest visual symbol of this conflict. It features the traditional horizontal bars of the rainbow flag but now it is bisected from the left by additional colours meant to represent  marginalized people of colour, trans people, and those living with HIV/AIDS. The point of the triangle cleaves into the rainbow at a 45o angle as if it were trying to split it in two, the formal arrangement of which brings to mind El Lissitzky's Soviet era constructivist image 'Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge' 1919. In Lissitzky's picture, the Bolshevik red wedge is shown symbolically dividing the mass of the anti-revolutionary white army.

 


The progress pride flag, and all the many variations of it testify to a fundamental failure of the LGBT movement and of the liberal identarian dream more generally. If the rainbow flag, which by its own definition is the most inclusive flag imaginable, is not sufficient to hold the demands of your ever expanding list of constituents, then this might point to the insufficiency of personal identity and self-expression for founding a stable political community, or to escape conflicts over competing Rights claims.   

The modern "prosumer" (producer/consumer) of digital capitalism will not settle for being integrated anonymously into a abstract concept like the all-inclusive rainbow spectrum. Visibility, a latecomer to the activist arsenal works like an agent-provocateur setting all against all in the battle to be seen. This should not come as a surprise, since in an attention economy like ours, governed by the extreme narcissism of contemporary liberal individualism, being seen, being noticed, might be the difference between sink or swim; at least according to the market based value system that contaminates all Western culture. It is clear that self-actualisation is rarely achieved without standing on the shoulders of others.

By the same token, the attempt to mollify and capture a declining civilisation under the same empty totality will fail. What is described as the woke capture of the institutions is actually this attempt, which aims to mitigate the negative externalities of our digitally dysphoric and ever more fragmented world by bureaucratic means. But DEI policies and disciplinary procedures are no substitute for values nurtured within real historical communities and real-world practices. Ultimately the rainbow stands for everything and thus stands for nothing. LGBT activism has been thoroughly co-opted by corporate interests and subsumed into the prevailing culture of marketing and rat-race self promotion. While at the same time its colourful imagery has been generalised into a society-wide palliative and encomium to quiet compliance with the ruling orthodoxy of managed decline. The rainbow symbol's only function now is as a brightly coloured boundary running through everything. Vaccinated,/unvaccinated, Brexiteer/Remainer, Fascist/anti-fascist, inside/outside, with us/against us. These absolutes are a selection from a far longer list which now serve to divide the modern West into opposing and utterly implacable camps.


Tuesday, 14 June 2022

Desiring and Acting Differently: A Sketch Towards a Critique of Consent (Redux)

 


2022 Introductory note: This overly long and convoluted essay was originally published in 2016 on a different platform, which is sadly no longer online. I think it’s worth republishing here as my opinions have not changed much in the interim. Two things do come to mind as I’m reading this back.

1 – The almost feverish manner in which I repeatedly try to reassure the reader that I take consent seriously, and that the occasion of my critique isn’t some awful prelude to a full-on exultation of manosphere values. It’s amusing to see these little summaries at the end of each section, which I’ve put into italics, as if I’m saying to the reader ‘No matter if you skimmed the rest, at least concentrate on this!’, all of them couched in defensive terms, “it is important to be very clear”, “Let me emphasise again that in no way…”, etc. There was a lot of pick-up-artist, manosphere attention on consent at the time and to not be enthusiastic for Leftist consent discourse was to risk being lumped in with some very unsavoury individuals.

2 – Quite soon after I wrote this it dawned on me that the ridiculously convoluted route I’ve taken here to make what were at the time a series of unfashionable arguments could be summed up quite straightforwardly with the following: Consent does not turn violence into non-violence, it merely turns it into legal violence. I should caveat this by drawing attention to the very timely We Can’t Consent to This campaign which has done much to push back against the defence of “consensual violence” in cases where women have suffered serious injury or been killed at the hands of men. Nevertheless, the fact that such a campaign group needs to exist proves my basic point.

 That I made such effort to construct a series of arguments - some more plausible than others – reflects my inability at the time to take what would have been the short route, straight through values. For if violence is the actual matter at hand, then all that is needed is to point out the empty formal quality of consent as it is used in the contemporary legal/social context, and demand an ethic of substantial values set against the normalisation of violence. This, of course, is the illiberal path, but it is the one that was quite obviously signposted, which is borne out by the fact that in turning away from that path I was driven to take these colourful extended detours through everything from speech-act theory to Medieval law.  

I think section 5, which revolves around Jennifer Doyle’s book Campus Sex, Campus Security, has some of the strongest material, not least as little did I know that in thinking about risk management and the bolstering of State paternalistic authority I was sketching what would become the central mode of power during the pandemic. It is a short step from risk management around sexual freedom to risk management around freedom in toto. This passage, which quotes Doyle, is especially suggestive:

  The appearance of consent classes as well as safe spaces is "shaped by the affective economy of a security culture in which a sense of injury and exposure revolves around sexual possibility - a possibility with the organizing force of a black hole" (Doyle 2015 pg28). This discourse of protection Doyle claims not only re-enforces but actually produces the subjectivities it claims to protect. Ultimately it constitutes a particularly insidious apparatus for normalising and inscribing both the essential fragility of the student-subject and the policing power of the university in its Neoliberal phase. Within these regimes of risk management sex appears as a thing, as a dangerous property possessed by "sexual sovereigns" that someone else might try to take away, or that we may misuse, and which we demand the state and university protect.

Risk management is in the second rank – behind Decline – as an interpretive key for the present. As for understanding the metastasis of authoritarian yearning among the administrative classes, it is indispensable.

 

2016 Text

1.

As I write, the verdict in the retrial of footballer Ched Evans has just recently been announced. The verdict itself is a shock but what is even more disheartening are the facts of the trial; that the complainant's personal sexual history was used against her after the judge made a rare exception to allow it as evidence, and that the family and partner of Evans was known to have offered a cash reward for information leading to his acquittal. The repercussions of this verdict and the precedent that the judge's exception may set will undoubtedly be felt for years to come and is a huge blow for women who seek to bring their attackers to justice. Once again bringing prejudice to bear against the sexual history of women who report rape has become a legitimate line of defence. To put it simply, this trial in the way it was allowed to be conducted has made women less safe and men more secure in their ability to rape without fear of conviction.

Currently then a critique of the use of consent as an effective concept within the discourse of rape prevention seems inopportune. Shouldn't we be defending the sanctity of the notion of consent, since it was precisely the autonomy of the victim and her right to deny consent that was being undermined in the Evans retrial? On the other hand, the trial also demonstrates the fragility of consent as a legal principle which enables us to identify harm in sexual matters. Given the right conditions, the right amount of prejudice, enough money, and a legal system that still fails women time after time, a person's right to give or deny consent can be overthrown. 

It is for this reason that a critique of consent - and in the case of this article - of the development of so called 'sexual consent classes' in universities, is worthwhile. It is meant to be a sketch so my lines of argumentation are multiple but do not reach the depth that they would deserve in a fuller exposition. Also, given the climate, it will unavoidably appear as a provocation. What I wish to argue is that the concept of consent is inadequate due to its being imported from the legal discourse of property and contract and that as such it imprints a highly abstract and alienating form onto sexual relations that erodes the aspects of mutuality and reciprocal gift-giving which are at the heart of all worthwhile human intimacy.

2a.

"Not everyone has the privilege to feel enthusiastic about sexual consent but that doesn't necessarily mean that they lack the freedom and capacity to make that choice..." (NUS Women, I Heart Consent Workshop Guide 2015) - Link no longer available

Sexual consent classes are a phenomenon that began in universities in the United States, but have over the last two or three years become increasingly prevalent in the UK. Their implementation has been spearheaded by the NUS as one approach to tackling the high rates of reported sexual harassment on university campuses. Depending on the source those rates range from one in five to over 50% of female students experiencing some kind of sexual harassment or assault while at university in the UK. The NUS conceive of consent classes as part of the standard induction package all new students should receive along with more general health and safety material, and information about IT and library recourses. This mirrors the reception of such measures in the US where they have been integrated into universities as part of their obligations under Title IX of the US Higher Education Act. Title IX is an amendment that covers safeguarding and how universities deal with accusations of discrimination and assault. To this end the UK NUS have produced a standardised guide for those organising consent classes.

Their introduction has not gone unnoticed and there have been several stories picked up by the mainstream media over the last two rounds of admissions. Last year we had George Lawlor at Warwick (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-34615631) who took offense at having attend the classes. He argued a common criticism of the classes that they imply all men are potentially rapists: "It's just that I feel if you need to be taught what consent is and what consent isn't, then you don't have respect for other human beings." This year as more student unions around the country introduced the classes there were even minor protests and walk-outs such as at York where third-year accounting student Ben Froughi encouraged a boycott arguing that the classes encouraged men and women to identify with the respective roles of potential victim and rapist. Interestingly the irked accountant also took issue with the implied contractual form of sexual bargaining: "There is no correct way to negotiate getting someone into bed with you. In suggesting that there is, consent talks encourage women to interpret sexual experiences that have not been preceded by a lengthy, formal, and sober contractual discussion as rape".

Despite increasing numbers of universities hosting such classes there is scant data either here or in the US, where they have run for many years, that the classes are effective in reducing the incidence of sexual assault. In fact, judging by the stats put out by the NUS, the reported rates seem to be increasing; although like such data produced by the police and government, this is often explained away by putting any increase down to the willingness of victims to come forward, and thus something in part to be celebrated. However, this is also an admission that there is no reliable data pertaining to the reality of the situation on the ground, or as yet any empirical means to assess the impact of the classes. Like those mysterious proclamations on the invisible war put out by security services we can well imagine NUS officers proudly counting up the number of potential rapists neutralised by their programs of prevention and countermeasures. It is important however to be very clear; my argument is not that the problem of sexual assault at Britain’s universities is trivial or overstated, nor is it that these techniques of management could never be effective (although as yet there is no evidence that they are). My claim is that their potential effectiveness carries with it a problematic discourse which undermines the good intentions from within.

2b.

The starting point for the NUS guide is the definition of consent from current UK legislation. In England and Wales a person consents if they agree "by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice". And in the Scottish sexual offenses act of 2009 consent is defined simply as "free agreement". Both these definitions are highly abstract renderings of basic principles from contract law emphasising notions of free agreement and the absence of force and fraud. Immediately in its legal form sexual relations are taken in part to be an instance of the exchange of goods or services involving the free contracting of the parties involved. 

Consent classes, the principal subjects of which are rape and rape culture, begin by reproducing this juridical and legalistic framework of sex crime legislation, as well as the vagueness of some clauses within those definitions. The classes tend however to expand on the legal definition to include examples of additional clauses while maintaining the contractual style already inherent in the legal definition. For instance, the NUS consent workshop guide includes “active, on-going conversation, and retractable” as attributes of consent while including “assumed, and previous consent” as examples of what genuine consent is not. Taken in isolation and as general pointers towards avoiding harm none of these examples is especially vexatious, although in practice some may be difficult to implement. Taken together they flesh out the vagueness of the current UK definition of sexual consent into a more concrete contractual form.

One of the difficulties both in the UK and US legal definition is that it admits the possibility of non-verbal consent, though the US code excludes that as a possibility in cases resulting from the use of force, threat of force, or placing another person in fear. Although the NUS consent class guide does not state consent should be explicit and verbal, the additional glosses on the UK and US legislation (especially that consent should never be assumed) and the overall contractual framework make the implication clear. Transparency and predictability of outcomes are key.

The clearest indicator of the abstract contractual nature of consent being put forward in the NUS guide is that it is explicitly separated from any notion of enthusiasm or enjoyment; surely the prime reason all things considered for having sex besides purely reproductive motivations. For the authors of the guide, consent functions seemingly as a purely formalistic concept within an exchange between two parties. The guide even goes so far as to describe enthusiastic consent (which we might translate as anticipating the possibility of actually enjoying the act) as a "privilege" and draws comparisons with the exchange between sex workers and their clients. This is a particularly striking comparison considering the continued "workerisation of sex" that I have drawn attention to elsewhere. 

In that case, guided by Neoliberal notions of entrepreneurship and human/erotic capital, advocates from the sex industry have argued against distinguishing sex-work from work in general, using a similar set of conceptual tools around consent and personal bargaining that they argue would reduce the dangers to sex-workers and combat prejudice. Paul Mason has argued in his book Post-Capitalism that this reflects a trend of contemporary Neoliberalism to capture "externalities"; aspects of our social lives that do not obviously conform to market or value generating transactions. (2022 note: In the wake of the pandemic this distinction has now almost entirely collapsed)

The direction this is heading in seems clear; human sexual relations are just like any other form of exchange within the economy. The fact that money may not actually change hands does not mean sexual exchange should be excluded from regimes of management where pleasure is rarely a significant factor. Ultimately sex is just another instance of one party wishing to obtain goods or services from another, fitting squarely within prevailing legal discourses of property and contract. Lovers become contracted partners in an amorous exchange and the estrangement of immanent human relations into the legal/juridical framework is further normalised. As so often in the most developed societies, security and risk management are the banners under which we are rapidly burying all possibility of a joyful form-of-life. Consent classes are potentially then a correlate to the reimagining of sex-work through the logic of work, contract, and entrepreneurship. And as such the sex-worker becomes the vector through which all sexual relations are being reconfigured along economic lines.

The consent classes, which would presumably be appropriate for anyone, are in fact part of a package from the US which includes the notions of “safe-spaces” and “trigger warnings” (both present in the NUS literature) which opponents argue have together contributed to infantilising an entire generation of students across the pond and is threatening to make relations between young people just as miserable and estranged over here. There has also been criticism of the use of safe spaces by some universities and interest groups to shut down legitimate criticism of Israel on the grounds that Jewish students felt threatened. This is however another issue entirely. Let me emphasise again that in no way am I suggesting that consent is an irrelevance for sexual relations (quite the opposite) or that one should casually reject the discourse around consent purely on the basis that it brings with it unforeseen consequences or types of language. Nevertheless, it is all too often forgotten that life and Law are fundamentally distinct realms and the assumption that the former might be contained and safeguarded by the later is a mistake that Western society in the modern period never ceases to repeat.

3.

"Our suggestion is that the presuppositions introduced by the pornographic conversations persist in the conversations with real women" (Langton 2009 pg187)

Consent, when referring to a verbal or other sign form of agreement is an example of a type of speech act called performative. Performatives are not like regular descriptive speech that report something about the world; the cat is on the mat, etc. Performatives do not merely describe a state of affairs but actually bring that state of affairs into being through their saying. When someone says "I promise" those words are not representing a promise but constitute the promise itself. Performatives do what they say. Similarly, J.L. Austin who first developed speech act theory in the 1960s uses the example of an umpire in tennis who when shouting "out" constitutes the ball 'as' out within the context of the game regardless of whether it actually was or not. Saying so 'makes it so'. This reality constituting aspect of performatives is central to American philosopher Judith Butler's queer theory and the possibility she sees of undermining prevalent norms of gender and sexuality; notably through the use of Drag.

Consent classes are not the first example of performatives being brought into issues around rape and sexual violence. Second wave feminists in the 1970s and 80s found Austin's work on performatives invaluable in building their case against pornography on the grounds that it depicted women in ways that caused "illocutionary disablement" of women in general. In short, the argument goes that the depiction of women in pornography as enjoying domination, as always available, as always saying yes - and critically when they do say no not really meaning it - meant that a women's capacity outside of pornography to refuse sex (refusal is also a performative) was negatively affected. Just as was the case during the Ched Evans retrial, consent is for all intents and purposes assumed. 

As Catherine MacKinnon put it in an influential essay: “pornography brings its conditions of production to the consumer, … establishing what woman are said to exist as, are seen as, are treated as, constructing the social reality of what a women is and can be in terms of what can be done to her, and what a man is in terms of doing it”(MacKinnon 1993 pg25). Pornography is said to make comparable pronouncements on the status of women as an umpire in tennis calling the ball out or a jury ruling a defendant guilty. As such it does not simply describe a state of affairs but continually constitutes and re-enforces that state of affairs.

Saying no is a refusal and like utterances of consent are speech acts that aim at a particular effect and are as such dependent on factors Austin called felicity conditions. These are particular conventions and references that allow a performative to actually have the effect it is intended to have, such as promising, accepting, etc. If, however, the one whom the refusal is directed to believes that women enjoy being coerced into sex, that for a woman to drink and enjoy herself is itself an invitation for sex, and that even when they say no they sometimes mean yes, the act of refusal can fail to count as an effective speech act. The felicity condition whereby the speaker’s refusal is taken to reflect genuine intention is absent or disputed, as such it fails to count as an effective illocution. Between the speakers, as Jennifer Hornsby has argued, there is a lack of reciprocity (Hornsby in Dwyer 1995 pg224).    

Although much of what MacKinnon and others argued about pornography at this time has been challenged, not least on the claim that it has a so-called power of 'divine performatives' that can socially construct women unchallenged, there was a sophistication to their critique that brought in ideas of how the wider discourse on sex within a society impacted an individual's sexual relations at a fundamental level. Consent classes however appear something of a step back from this insofar as they take the concept of consent in a more or less uncritical way, as if it were not also dependent on particular conventions and subject to the vagaries and dominant interests within the wider discursive environment in which it is used. 

Although these classes do address the influence of rape culture (a term retained from MacKinnon's era) it could well be argued that the claims made about refusal by second wave feminists apply equally to consent and that wider societal and ideological factors have a part to play in how such speech acts function and the sort of social relations they entail. The question we need to then ask is what are the felicity conditions that make consent intelligible in its contemporary form? I have already drawn attention to the legal economic influence which brings sexual consent into the realm of contract and exchange, but what about other historical sources?

4.

"When the ethical - and not simply cognitive - connection that unites words, things, and human actions is broken, this in fact promotes a spectacular and unprecedented proliferation of vain words on the one hand and, on the other, of legislative apparatuses that seek obstinately to legislate on every aspect of that life on which they seem no longer to have any hold" (Agamben 2011 pg70-71)

The etymology of consent leads back to the Latin consentio/consentire; literally to ‘feel-together’ or to be of the same mind. For the ancient Romans however the word never had the status of a technicus terminus in legal or economic writing and is instead found across the literature in numerous contexts evoking the sense of being of common mind or shared sentiment. The development of consent as a concept in modern legal discourse and the caveat in the NUS literature excluding enthusiastic consent makes clear however that sentiment or mutual feeling are not significant factors in its contemporary use. The sex worker does not feel the same about the act as the client. It should not surprise us that the etymological shift towards an increasingly abstract form of agreement took place during the 13th century when so much of the basic framework of modern systems of Law were being worked out across Europe.

In English law it makes a prominent appearance near the end of that century in the Statutes of Westminster where for the first time the notion of sexual consent is developed independently of whether a girl (such laws dealt solely with girls) were married. In Roman and Cannon law a girl's perceived capacity to consent was tied entirely to the age of womanhood and marriage. Consenting to marriage necessarily implied consent to sex and the two were more or less indexed to the onset of puberty and as such the physical capacity to bear children. As Victoria Bates writes recently "Consent in itself was not the focus of these laws, in which a man’s right to take a girl’s chastity – ideally, but not necessarily, with her consent – came with marriage". The marriage agreement was taken to give the husband a right in the use of the wife's body, ostensibly for child rearing; a perspective on the institution of marriage that lived on well into the 20th century.  

Bates also draws attention to the 1885 Criminal Law Amendment Act which gave us our modern two tier system of consent laws which set the felony age at 13 and misdemeanour age at 16. What is essential for our discussion is how the setting of the two ages reflected concerns about unruly sexual desire in young girls. "Before full maturity – physical and mental – girls were thought to need protection not only from men, but also from their own new and disorderly sexual feelings. This question of ‘capacity’ was a double-edged one: it complemented a child protection agenda, but also supported those who feared that girls (especially working-class girls) would ‘fall’ early and should not be given the opportunity to do so. 

This balance between protection and control ran throughout much Victorian legislation" (Ibid). In effect the raising of the age of consent to 16 reflected as much a desire to control young women as to protect children. I don't believe it is too much to suggest that today's discourse of consent as it plays out in the courts and social media and in particular how a woman's clothing, her choice to drink, her choice of company and lifestyle retain the signature of this desire to control and condemn female sexuality.   

Leading into modernity there have then been two distinct but interrelated discourses on consent which now find themselves united in the contemporary concept. On the one hand a notion tied to the institutions of marriage, childbirth and ethico/religious obligations; on the other an increasingly general and abstract notion tied to the development of the law of property and contract, and of the human being as an economic subject. It is clear that many aspects of the first discourse continue to influence the moral landscape around consent, with women bearing most of the negative consequences. 

It is also clear however that with the detraditionalisation of established sources of ethical norms, such as the church, the family and the local community, that it is the economic discourse of consent which now holds sway over the field. More broadly, as the aspect of reciprocal feeling inherent in the ancient usage has receded, the concept of consent has increasingly come to be associated with individuals embroiled in some form of negotiation. Its fate is like many other concepts in the Western metaphysical tradition; its character as an emblem of singular being-together, of common life, is hollowed out, abstracted and finally marooned as a mere statement representing the ascent of an individual to a matter present-at-hand.

5.

"Making oneself vulnerable: Is that not what we do in friendship, and in desire?" (Doyle pg49)

The continued failure of the judiciary to properly protect women, instead perpetuating prejudice; and the proliferation of discourses collapsing the distinction between sex and other forms of economic activity are not phenomena opposed to each other. Both rely on the efficacy of the performative ‘consent’ as a means to constitute harmless relations or identify harmful ones. As such consent relies on certain conditions of intelligibility, which Austin called felicity conditions, in order to function. These include the distribution of roles, responsibilities and rights, and obligations drawn from prevailing social relations. Or as Italian philosopher Maurizio Lazzarato put it in a recent critique of the emancipatory potential of speech act theory: "Just as the performative codifies enunciations, utterances, and their effects, it also institutionalises speakers and listeners, their respective roles and ranks, and the public space of their acts. The "subjects" that emerge here take no risks and do not engage themselves "personally""(Lazzarato pg174).

As we have seen, the discourse of sexual consent is inseparable from its history as a means of managing female sexuality either in association with marriage and child rearing or the supposed dangers of precocious and disorderly female desire. Consent more generally is also inseparable from its development as a key concept in the history of property and contract law, and in the present era the generalisation of those discourses as models for all human activity as life continues to be marketized. It is for these reasons that I argue that making consent the foundational concept of any discourse dealing with sex will not help produce healthy, flourishing relations between people, nor ultimately prevent harm.

The situation in the courts and the continued prevalence of prejudice against women remain a salient example of how this historical baggage combined with legal exactitude are ensuring the failure to prevent or even identify that harm. Victoria Bates' reflections on the 19th century consent laws and their ambivalent motivation similarly allow us to understand this strange dual view of women as simultaneously 'at risk' and 'a risk'.

Returning to the situation in the universities Jennifer Doyle's recent book Campus Sex Campus Security (Doyle 2016) describes how concerns around sexual harassment have articulated with the university security apparatus in the US. Doyle claims that outmoded paternalistic myths about female vulnerability have been generalised in the contemporary era and are now captured within the ubiquitous discourse of risk management. The appearance of consent classes as well as safe spaces is "shaped by the affective economy of a security culture in which a sense of injury and exposure revolves around sexual possibility - a possibility with the organizing force of a black hole" (Doyle 2015 pg28). This discourse of protection Doyle claims not only re-enforces but actually produces the subjectivities it claims to protect. Ultimately it constitutes a particularly insidious apparatus for normalising and inscribing both the essential fragility of the student-subject and the policing power of the university in its Neoliberal phase. 

Within these regimes of risk management sex appears as a thing, as a dangerous property possessed by "sexual sovereigns" that someone else might try to take away, or that we may misuse, and which we demand the state and university protect. Just as pre-nuptial agreements were meant to protect the property of the rich in acrimonious divorce settlements, and modern sugar daddy agencies seek to formalise that type of relationship outside of marriage, here the juridical framework of contract is again called upon to smooth over precarious interpersonal relations, which in an atmosphere of cultural anomie and litigious anxiety, increasingly lack any other grounding. The historical unfolding of contract and consent, while always carrying with it the mark of freedom and individualism, has also - and always been - a way for life to be captured in Law.

6.

"We must think that what exists is far from filling all possible spaces. To make a truly unavoidable challenge of the question: What can be played?" (Foucault 1997 pg140)

This is meant to be a sketch for a critique, and I make no claim to any magic bullet for the problems of sexual violence and how Western societies are addressing them. However, to bring this to some sort of conclusion it may be worth reflecting on one kind of utterance that Lazzarato opposes to the performative. Michel Foucault's late work included extended reflections on the ancient Greek practice of parrhesia, a word with no direct translation but which is to do with truth telling or true speech. This is however not the kind of speech that merely describes a state of affairs. 

As Foucault put it in almost tautological fashion: "parrhesia involves the way in which by asserting the truth, and in the very act of this assertion, one constitutes oneself as the person who tells the truth, who has told the truth, and who recognises oneself in and as the person who has told the truth" (Foucault 2011 pg68). In such speech it is the speakers themselves who appear rather than in the case of performatives like consent, where what appears is merely the matter present at hand. The latter case brings in nothing that is not already decided upon or pre-assigned to accepted roles and responsibilities, of what can and cannot be said. Whereas in parrhesia it is the speaker’s freedom that appears and their courage.

In his writing on this "courage of truth" Foucault describes different situations where parrhesia is in play, several of which are political in nature such as Pericles speech to the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war. Indeed, at times it is as if for the French philosopher the function of parrhesia takes on a significance for the wellbeing of a political community that surpasses even that argued by Cicero for classical rhetoric. For our purposes, on the interpersonal level it is also crucial to emphasise that this openness in truth is a deeply ethical one that always demands a reciprocal openness on the part of the other which Foucault describes as the "parrhesiastic pact". This is especially the case as the question of the free and moral subject comes back to the question of the true discourse in which this moral subject constitutes itself, and the question of the relation of power in which this subject is formed(Foucault 2011 pg68). What is crucial to this argument is that for Foucault this kind of truth telling is the highest exercise of freedom, albeit a dangerous one.

Dangerous perhaps because unlike with performatives parrhesia does not produce a codified effect, rather it opens up an unspecified risk (Foucault 2011 pg62). As such it is entirely opposed to the contractual logic animating the contemporary discourse of consent with its emphasis on predetermined, predictable outcomes and risk management. Parrhesia as an eruption of truth means that the situation between the partners is open, no longer predictable and that consequences cannot be known in advance. A declaration of love or desire always carries with it great risk for both parties. 

However, clarity is essential here; parrhesia is not opposed to consent. On the contrary, at the very fundamental level (the level of not forcing people to do things they do not wish to) consent is presupposed by parrhesia. Within a parrhesiastic situation the will to dominate the other must be entirely absent for the play of risk and openness to function, and it is only through such an interplay that a break with the predictable, with the closed and cold logic of sexual exchange can be made, that love and sex might reach the level of an event.

This is admittedly a somewhat vague and certainly more difficult form of relationship to think compared to the familiarity of legal terms that increasing guide our public and personal lives. I hold however that it and other similar notions constitute a far better starting point for ethical sexual relationships than the limited and tainted discourse of consent. If there is any desire left in this world to resist the transformation of all social life into market transactions; any desire to resist human intimacy being subsumed under economic categories; or any imagination left to conceive of a break with the conditions of the past, then it will involve re-thinking sexual relations and sex education along these kind of lines.

References

Agamben,Giorgio 2011 - The Sacrament of Language (Cambridge, Polity Press)

Doyle,Jennifer  2015 - Campus Sex, Campus Security (Semiotext, California)

Dwyer, Susan (Ed.) 1995 - The Problem of Pornography (Belmont, Calif.:Wadsworth Publishing Company)

Foucault, Michel 1997 Ethics:Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Vol 1 (London Penguin Books)

Foucault,Michel 2011 - The Government of Self and Others (New York, Palgrave Macmillan)

Langton, Rae - Sexual Solipsism (2009) (Oxford University Press, London)

MacKinnon, Catharine 1993 - Only Words (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press)

Lazzarato,Maurizio - Signs and Machines: Capitalism and Production of Subjectvity 2014 (Semiotext, California)